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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AFTER APPRENDI:
RECENT CASES IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Criminal defendants in this country enjoy a constitutional protection
that requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element that defines the crime with which the defendant is charged.' In
calling what appears to be an element of a crime something else, such as
a "rebuttable presumption" or "affirmative defense," legislatures have
evaded the burden of submitting these issues to a jury to be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.2 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, such
elements are referred to as "sentencing factors.",3 Under the guidelines a
sentencing judge need only find such sentencing factors by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.4
In June 2000, the landmark decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey
5
sharply curtailed this use of sentence enhancers. The Supreme Court held
in Apprendi, that the Constitution requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.",6 This ruling effectively shifted the
burden of proving sentencing factors that increase the statutory maxi-
mum penalty away from the sentencing judge and the preponderance of
the evidence standard.7 Instead, the burden was placed back on the
prosecutor, with the attendant burden of proving the sentencing factor as
an element to the jury under the more rigorous beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.8
Although the ruling in Apprendi produced a broad range of effects
on sentencing, 9 this paper focuses on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit's interpretation and application of the Apprendi rule
in certain cases decided between September 1, 2001, and August 31,
2002. Specifically, this paper examines how the Tenth Circuit has ap-
plied the Apprendi rule where a defendant's minimum, rather than
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970).




5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
7. See Olsen, supra note 2, at 812.
8. Id.
9. See Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing; Changes in Guide-
lines, Raft of Appeals Feared After Justices' Decision, WASH. POST, July 23, 2000, at Al.
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maximum, sentence is increased by sentencing factors that were never
alleged or proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
Part I of this survey reviews several landmark cases decided by the
Supreme Court from 1970 to the present. Part II of this survey then ana-
lyzes two cases from the Tenth Circuit decided in 2001 and 2002, exam-
ining how the Tenth Circuit court interpreted and applied the ruling in
Apprendi. Finally, Part UI of this survey suggests that the Apprendi ra-
tionale be extended to cover increased statutory minimum sentencing, as
well as maximum as was prescribed in Apprendi.
I. BACKGROUND
To appreciate how the Apprendi rule arrived at the Tenth Circuit, it
is important to examine some of the key decisions that laid the ground-
work for Apprendi.
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided the landmark In re Winship l°
case. Therein, the Court addressed the question of whether the reasonable
doubt standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard,
is required during the adjudication of a juvenile case where the juvenile
is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult." The case involved a twelve-year-old boy who entered a locker
and stole $112 from a woman's purse.' 2 If an adult had committed the
act, the crime of larceny could be charged.' 3 After acknowledging that
the evidence against the defendant might not amount to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the trial judge stated that such proof was not required
under the Fourteenth Amendment, relying instead on a preponderance of
the evidence standard.' 4 After the trial court's decision was affirmed on
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.15
In Winship, the Court codified the principle that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."' 6 Although the Winship Court clearly established
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "all essential elements of guilt"' 7
was a requirement of due process of law, the Court left open the question
of how to define an essential element. 8 Plainly favoring the more rigor-ous reasonable doubt standard, the Court stated that due process requires
10. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359.
12. Id. at 360.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 360-61.
16. Id. at 364.
17. See id. at 361.
18. Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land:" Statutory Mini-
mums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 Am. J. CRIM. L. 377, 391 (2002).
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that no one should lose his or her liberty unless the government has
"'borne the burden of... convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this
end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable.... ."19
A. Clarifying Winship
The Supreme Court upheld the rationale of Winship when it decided
the 1975 case of Mullaney v. Wilbur. At issue in Mullaney was a Maine
murder statute which included "malice aforethought, either express or
implied," as an element of the crime of murder. The trial court in-
structed the jury that "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensa-
ble element of the crime of murder., 22 Further, the jury was instructed
that "if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional
and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied, unless
the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation., 23 The Court con-
cluded that shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove an element of
the crime charged violates the Due Process Clause under Winship, and
the burden was on the prosecution to prove absence of the heat of pas-
24sion on sudden provocation under the Maine statute. In Mullaney, the
district court and initially the First Circuit held that "malice afore-
thought" was an essential element of the crime charged.25 The Court, in
upholding Winship, would not allow the legislature to require the defen-
dant to prove the absence of malice aforethought rather than requiring
26the prosecution to prove its presence.
If the decision in Mullaney removed some of the power of the legis-
lature to define what constitutes an essential element of a crime, Patter-
son v. New York,27 decided two years later in 1977,28 perhaps gave some
of that power back. In Patterson, the defendant was charged with murder
under a New York statute similar to Maine's, except the New York stat-
ute did not require "malice aforethought, either express or implied.,
29
Under the New York statute, a defendant could instead reduce his or her
sentence by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was
committed while the defendant experienced an "extreme emotional dis-
19. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958)).
20. 421 U.S. 684, 684 (1975).
21. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 687 n.3 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed
1976)).
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 703-04.
25. Id. at 690.
26. Id. at 700-01.
27. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
28. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197.
29. Id. at 198.
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turbance." 30 The defendant in the case argued this violated his due proc-
ess rights, in much the same way the Maine statute had violated Mul-
laney's, because proving extreme emotional disturbance operated as an
affirmative defense.
The Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeals' re-
jection of the defendant's argument and distinguished Patterson from
Mullaney on the ground that the statute did not shift the burden to the
defendant to disprove an essential element of the crime. 32 The Patterson
Court emphasized its position by stating that if an intentional killing is
shown by proving each element of the crime, "the State intends to deal
with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates the mitigating
circumstances. 33
Under both the Maine and New York statutes, a defendant would be
guilty of murder where the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally killed another. 34 Under both stat-
utes, the defendant can reduce a murder charge to one of manslaughter
by proving mitigating circumstances, either by rebutting a "presumption"
in Maine, or by asserting an "affirmative defense" in New York.35 How-
36ever, in Mullaney the sentence was found unconstitutional, while in
Patterson it was affirmed.37 The Court effectively reached opposite con-
38
clusions in these cases under similar statutes. The important difference
between the New York and Maine statutes, however, is that the language
of the New York statute does not specifically allow the jury to presume
an essential element of the crime charged.39
B. What is an "Element?"
After Patterson, there remained the question of how far legislatures
might go in redefining elements of a crime as sentencing factors.40 The
core issue presented in Mullaney and Patterson, of exactly what aspects
of a crime are required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, was fur-
ther addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1986 case of McMillan v.
41Pennsylvania. In this case, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
30. Levine, supra note 18, at 392 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney
1975)).
31. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 206.
34. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)
(McKinney 1975).
35. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (repealed 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)
(McKinney 1975).
36. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703.
37. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201.
38. See Levine, supra note 18, at 392.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 393.
41. 477 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).
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a legislature enacting a statute requiring sentencing judges to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence based on "sentencing factors" presented to
the judge at sentencing and found only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.4 Under the Pennsylvania statute, such sentencing factors were
specifically distinguished from elements of the crime.43 The Court as-
serted that the rationale from Patterson, that legislatures have great free-
dom to characterize elements of crimes, controlled the present case.44
Applying this rationale, the Court concluded that Pennsylvania was free
to define what might otherwise appear to be elements of a crime as "sen-
tencing factors," thereby alleviatinf the State from the burden of proving
them beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 "Patterson teaches that we should
hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its
chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties.
46
The specific sentencing scheme addressed in McMillan was Penn-
sylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,47 which provided that
after a jury had convicted a defendant of certain enumerated felonies, a
48sentencing judge could increase the sentence within the statutory range.
Under this act, if a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant committed the felony he or she was convicted of while "visi-
bly possess[ing] a firearm," that judge could impose a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of five years. 49 The Court noted bluntly that the statute
acted to "divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less
than five years. '50 The Court outlined five reasons for finding this
sentencing scheme constitutional. 5' First, the statute did not transgress
52the limits set forth in Patterson. Second, the statute did not create a
presumption against the defendant, thereby divesting the prosecution of
its burden of proving guilt.5 3 Third, the statute did not increase the maxi-
mum penalty afforded the sentencing judge.54 Fourth, the statute created
no separate offense with a separate penalty. 55 Finally, the statute did not
42. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-81.
43. Id. at 82 n. 1.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Id. at 85-86.
46. Id. at 86.
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
48. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81; see Analisa Swan, Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Scaling Back of
the Sentencing Factor Revolution and the Resurrection of Criminal Defendant Rights, How Far is
Too Far?, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 729, 739 (2002) (stating that under the statute applied in McMillan, after
a defendant was convicted, a judge could extend the defendant's sentence if the judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm).
49. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (a)).
50. Id. at 81-82.
51. Id. at 86-88.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 87.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 88.
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have the effect of allowing the sentencing factor to be the "tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense. '56
Although the McMillan holding may appear to be a blow against the
rights of criminal defendants, the Court stressed that the freedom of the
legislature to pursue this course was not without limits. 57 For instance,
the Court pointed out that the Due Process Clause prevents states from
"discarding the presumption of innocence" and the burden of proving
guilt.58 In fact, the Court stressed, the statute at issue only became effec-
tive after the defendant was convicted of the crime charged. 59 Therefore,
the fact that the legislature categorized an aspect of a crime as a "sen-
tencing factor," rather than an actual element of the underlying offense,
was constitutional because it was within the states established power to
define the elements of its crimes. 6° The McMillan Court similarly failed
to delineate the extent to which legislatures may go in defining, or rede-
fining, elements of crimes as sentencing factors, despite the five-part
"test" the Court outlined.61
In 1998, in the case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States,62 a 5-4
decision, the Court held that every factor of the McMillan five-part test
63need not be met, even where a sentencing factor increases the statutory
penalty, because the judge may determine the presence or absence of
facts with respect to sentencing factors.64 Under the statute at issue in
Almendarez-Torres, a deported alien, who illegally re-entered the United
States, faced a prison sentence of up to two years. 65 However, if the sen-
tencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the previous
deportation was for the commission of an aggravated felony, the judge
could impose a sentence of as much as twenty years. 66 The Court recog-
nized that because neither Winship, nor Mullaney, nor Patterson pro-
vided the necessary guidance to determine whether a sentencing factor,
here, recidivism, should be an element, it was necessary to apply the
McMillan five part test.67 In doing so, the Court listed the five parts of
the test and concluded that the statute at issue
56. Id.
57. Id. at 85-86.
58. Id. at 87.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 86.
61. See Swan, supra note 48, at 741.
62. 523 U.S. 224, 225-26 (1998).
63. Almandarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244-46.
64. Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Ele-
ments" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1059
(1999).
65. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
66. Id. at 226 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)).
67. See id. at 239-43.
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failed only the third prong because the sentencing factor increased the
maximum allowable penalty.
68
The Court's reasoning focused on both a careful reading of the stat-
ute as well as recidivism's typical role as a sentencing factor. 69 In charac-
terizing recidivism as a sentencing factor, the Court stated that the "rele-
vant statutory subject matter is recidivism," and that it "is as typical a
sentencing factor as one might imagine., 70 Despite the potential for an
increased maximum penalty under this statute due to a finding of recidi-
vism by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the Court "express[ed] no
view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sen-
tencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of the sen-
tence.",7' The Court based this statement on the fact that the defendant
had admitted his recidivism when he pled guilty, and it would therefore
be difficult to show that a heightened standard of proof would make any
difference in his case.72 Although the Almendarez-Torres opinion ap-
peared to embrace the legislature's power to define the difference be-
tween an element and a sentencing factor, the Court's emphasis seemed
to shift once again, just one year later.
C. Drawing the Line on Elements: Jones v. United States
73
In 1999, the Court decided the case of Jones v. United States.74 The
Jones opinion clarified the Court's position on the issue of what aspects
of crimes can properly be classified as elements or sentencing factors,
which had been hinted at in earlier decisions in this area.75 At issue in
Jones was a federal carjacking statute76 that provided a maximum sen-
tence of fifteen years.77 However, if serious bodily injury or death re-
sulted, the maximum penalty increased to twenty-five years or life, re-
spectively. 78 The Court held that injury and death were in fact not sen-
tence enhancers, but were essential elements.79 In doing so, however, the
Court recognized the possibility of the opposite view.80 The Court rea-
soned that "[any doubt that might be prompted by the arguments for that
other reading should, however, be resolved against it under the rule, re-
peatedly affirmed, that 'where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
68. Id. at 242-43.
69. Id. at 228, 230.
70. Id. at 230.
71. Id. at 248.
72. Id. at 247-48.
73. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
74. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
75. Id. at 251 n. II ("[Ojur decision today does not announce any new principle of constitu-
tional law, but merely interprets a particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns
that have emerged through a series of our decisions over the past quarter century.").
76. Id. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988)).
77. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
78. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119).
79. Id. at 239.
80. Id.
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tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise
and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter."'
8'
In language that perhaps foretold the later Apprendi rule, the Court
stated: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.,
82
In response to the dissent's concern that the holding would interfere
with the states' efforts to bring uniformity to their sentencing guidelines
and practices, the Court emphasized that "our decision today does not
announce any new principle of constitutional law, but merely interprets a
particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional concerns that
have emerged through a series of our decisions over the past quarter cen-
tury.' 83 This narrow holding was restricted to facts that increase the
maximum penalty and did not directly address the issue raised when a
sentencing factor increases the minimum sentence imposed.
84
In 2000, the Court decided the case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.
85
The Court addressed the issue of "whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing
an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20
years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
,,86doubt. In Apprendi, the defendant was charged with several counts,
including first-degree murder, after firing shots into the house of an Afri-
can-American couple.87 The defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful pos-
session of a firearm in the second degree, which carried a sentence of
five to ten years.88 At sentencing, if the judge found this crime was not
motivated by racial bias, the maximum penalty for this count would be
ten years.8 9 However, if the judge found the crime was motivated by ra-
cial bias, the allowable penalty would increase to thirty years, with a
maximum penalty of twenty years on the weapons charge.90 At sentenc-
ing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the crimes
Apprendi was convicted of committing were motivated by racial bias,
81. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)).
82. Id. at 243 n.6.
83. Id. at 252 n. 11.
84. See id. at 243 n.6.
85. 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000).
86. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 469-70.




and the sentence enhancer therefore applied. 91 The defendant was sen-
tenced to twelve years on the weapons possession charge.92 Effectively,
the defendant had been sentenced to twelve years for a crime that carried
a maximum penalty of ten years.93 After the state supreme court affirmed
the sentence,94 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed in a 5-4 decision.
95
After examining its cases in this area, the Court confirmed the opin-
ion expressed in Jones that other than prior convictions, facts that in-
crease penalties beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.96 The Court further endorsed
the rule proposed in a concurring opinion in Jones that, "'[it is unconsti-
tutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts
that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defen-
dant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 97 In light of this, the Court held that
use of the hate-crime sentence enhancer, which had been found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and which had effectively raised the maxi-
mum penalty from ten to twenty years against the defendant, was uncon-
stitutional.98
The principal dissent accused the Apprendi majority of overruling
McMillan, which upheld an increased mandatory minimum sentencing
scheme based on sentencing factors. 99 Justice Stevens, writing for the
Apprendi majority, specifically denied this claim in a footnote,'0° instead
limiting the McMillan holding to "cases that do not involve the imposi-
tion of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the of-
fense established by the jury's verdict."' 0'1 Stopping short of overturning
McMillan, the Court "reserve[d] for another day the question whether
stare decisis considerations preclude reconsideration of its [McMillan]
narrower holding." 102
After Apprendi, the question of whether McMillan still stood was
presented to the court in Harris v. United States.10 3 In Harris, the defen-
dant was charged with selling illegal narcotics while carrying an uncon-
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 470, 471.
94. Id. at 472.
95. Id. at 468,474, 497.
96. Id. at 490.
97. Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
98. See id. at 470, 491-93.
99. Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is incumbent on the Court... to admit that it is
overruling McMillan.").
100. Id. at 487 n.13.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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cealed semiautomatic pistol at his side. °4 The defendant was charged
under a federal statute that provided a person convicted of carrying a
firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime a minimum
sentence of no less than seven years, in addition to the punishment for
the crime of drug trafficking. 105 The defendant pleaded guilty and was
convicted of the drug trafficking charge. 106 The government assumed that
the statutory provision defined a single crime and that brandishing a fire-
arm was, therefore, a sentencing factor; thus, the indictment mentioned
nothing about brandishing. 0 7 The district court found that the defendant
had brandished a gun and, pursuant to the statute, imposed the mandatory
minimum sentence of seven years.108
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that
brandishing a gun was an element of a separate offense that must be in-
cluded in the indictment and conviction. °9 The court relied on the rea-
soning that McMillan foreclosed his argument "that if brandishing is a
sentencing factor, as a statutory matter the statute is unconstitutional in
light of Apprendi."'10
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant in Harris argued
that the constitutional concerns evident in Apprendi applied to sentencing
factors that increase a defendant's minimum penalty. In affirming the
Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court rejected the defendant's argument in
another 5-4 decision. 1 2 The Court began its analysis with a construction
of the challenged statute. 1 3 The Court drew a clear distinction between
the elements of the crime listed in the statute and the sentencing factors
listed after the elements.' 14 The majority reasoned that sentencing factors
do not become elements merely because legislatures require the judge to
impose a minimum sentence when those facts are found. 15 The Court
noted that there is no reason, when viewed from a historical context, that
the framers of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would have considered
sentencing factors as elements of a crime, even though they may be
stigmatizing and punitive.'16 The Court added, "[T]his conclusion mightbe questioned if there were extensive historical evidence showing that
104. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550.
105. Id. at 550-51 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a)(ii) (1994)).
106. Id. at 571-73.




111. Id. at 564-65.
112. See id. at 548, 551-52.
113. Id. at 551-52.
114. Id. at 555-56.




facts increasing the defendant's minimum sentence (but not affecting the
maximum) have, as a matter of course, been treated as elements."
' 17
Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, recognized that McMillan
and Apprendi were in conflict, and that the "Court's holding today there-
fore rests on either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the very princi-
ples that animated Apprendi."" 8 He added that his decision would be to
reaffirm Apprendi and reverse the Fourth Circuit, thereby overruling the
McMillan holding. 119
Interestingly, on the same day the Court decided Harris, it also af-
firmed the limits on increased statutory maximum penalties set forth in
Apprendi when it decided Ring v. Arizona.120 The Ring Court invalidated
capital sentencing schemes that allow judges to find "aggravating fac-
tors" by a preponderance of the evidence, where such factors can lead to
imposition of the death penalty.
121
In this discussion, it is also important to note the Tenth Circuit's
2000 decision of United States v. Hishaw.122 The defendant in Hishaw
was indicted for intending to distribute "approximately two... ounces of
cocaine base."' 123 Two ounces of cocaine base was enough to trigger a
sentence of ten-years to life under the relevant statute. 24 However, the
term "approximately two ounces" could just as easily be interpreted as
actually requiring less than the two ounces to trigger the ten-year to life
sentence. Additionally, there was no indication that the jury actually
determined what quantity of cocaine the defendant possessed. 126 The
Hishaw Court concluded that because of the "ambiguous allegation as to
the quantity of cocaine base involved, and because of Apprendi,. . . the
failure to require specific findings regarding the quantity of cocaine con-
stitutes a 'plain or obvious' error."'
127
As evidenced by the disagreement found in Harris128 and
McMillan,129 the Supreme Court decisions in many of these cases are
strongly divided. At present, facts regarded by the legislature as sentenc-
ing factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
unless they affect the sentence imposed by increasing the maximum al-
117. id.
118. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607-08.
122. 235 F.3d 565, 571-72 (10th Cir. 2000).
123. Hishaw, 235 F.3d at 575.




128. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 548.
129. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80.
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lowable penalty.' 30 Furthermore, sentencing factors that increase the
minimum sentence, even substantially, are outside the purview of Ap-
prendi.13 However, the state of the law in this area appears uncertain and
the decisions continue to be volatile. Indeed, even the circuit courts have
not been entirely consistent in interpreting and applying Apprendi.
32
IH. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
A. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. Lujan
133
a. Facts
Defendant Joseph Lujan, along with a co-defendant, set up a sale of
one pound of methamphetamine to an undercover law enforcement
agent. 134 After he met with the agent, provided a sample, and discussed
price and payment, Lujan agreed to supply more methamphetamine.1
35
When Lujan brought more of the drug for the agent to purchase, the
agent left the scene, purportedly to get more money for the purchase .
36
Officers then apprehended Lujan and seized three pounds of metham-
phetamine from the scene. 137 Lujan admitted he had originally delivered
the methamphetamine to a co-defendant's house, that he knew what the
drug was, and that he was to receive compensation for his part in the
sale. 138 The defendant was indicted on three counts arising from this at-
tempt to sell approximately three pounds of methamphetamine to the
agent 139 The defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he
pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiring with his co-defendants to
possess and distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine.1
40
The sentencing judge calculated Lujan's sentence under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to be between 108 and 135 months, and then said that
Lujan would be sentenced to 108 months. 141 The probation officer then
130. See Criminal Law and Procedure-Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 230, 234-35 (2002)
[hereinafter Criminal Law and Procedure].
131. See United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1171 (10th Cir. 2002).
132. Compare United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (extending Apprendi to
mandatory minimum sentences), overruled by Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), with
United States v. Mazzio, 2002 WL 31164256 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Harris overruled the
Circuit's previous decisions that applied Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the Sixth
Circuit also recognized that Harris overruled Strayhorn in United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377
(6th Cir. 2002)).
133. 268 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001).
134. Lujan, 268 F.3d at 966.
135. Id. at 966-67.
136. Id. at 967.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 966.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 967.
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pointed out that under the statute the defendant was charged with violat-
ing, he was subject to a mandatory minimum of ten years, which the
judge then imposed.' 42 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant
argued that his sentence violated the principle enunciated in Apprendi,
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'143 The de-
fendant's contention was that because of ambiguity in the indictment, its
language could be interpreted to mean either fifty grams of pure
methamphetamine or fifty grams of a mixture containing only a trace
amount of methamphetamine.' 44 If the indictment were interpreted to
mean a mixture, the defendant's minimum sentence would be five years
instead of ten. 1
45
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit at once recognized that the defendant's case, on
the facts, did not reveal an Apprendi error, 46 since the drug quantity that
the defendant pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced for, was specified in
the indictment. 47 For the defendant to prevail, therefore, the court ac-
knowledged that he had to "convince [the court] first to modify the rule
of Apprendi by making it applicable to the mandatory minimum sentence
established by a particular statute."' 148 The court recognized the Sixth
Circuit opinion in United States v. Strayhorn,149 which interpreted Ap-
prendi as mandating that a drug quantity that triggers a mandatory mini-
mum sentence must be included in an indictment and submitted to a
jury.' 50 The court said, however, that this was not enough: "Even if we
were to follow Strayhorn and extend the rationale of Apprendi to manda-
tory minimum sentences, however, that alone would not entitle Lujan to
relief." 151 Again, this was because the government's indictment did al-
lege possession of a quantity of the drug sufficient to trigger the manda-
tory minimum, to which the defendant had pled guilty.1
The defendant's argument, however, depended on the specific lan-
guage contained in the statute. 53 If the fifty grams of methamphetamine
referred to in the indictment could actually mean fifty grams of a mixture
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
144. Id. at 969.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 967-68.
147. ld. at 968.
148. Id.
149. 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001).
150. Lujan, 268 F.3d at 969 (citing United States v. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d 462, 468-71 (6th Cir.
2001) (extending Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the Sixth Circuit recognized that
Harris overruled this extension in Mazzio and Leachman).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 966-67.
153. Id. at 969.
2003]
618 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
containing a trace amount of methamphetamine, then the minimum sen-
tence would be five years instead of ten. 154 Reviewing only for plain er-
ror, the court concluded that the indictment meant fifty grams of
methamphetamine, not a mixture. 155 The court concluded that the manda-
tory minimum sentence was therefore proper under the statute. 56 Be-
cause of this, the defendant's sentence would not have changed even if
the court had adopted the rule urged by the defendant. 157 In reaching this
conclusion, the court declined to actually investigate whether Apprendi
should be applied to mandatory minimum sentences, and affirmed the
sentence imposed by the district court.
58
2. United States v. Avery'
59
a. Facts
On January 30, 2000, a confidential informant notified drug en-
forcement agents that a man identified as John Avery, the defendant, was
selling crack cocaine from his home, and that the informant had person-
ally seen four ounces of cocaine at the defendant's residence.' Based on
this information, the agents arranged for the informant to buy cocaine
from the defendant at the defendant's residence.' 61 Thereafter the agents
searched the home and recovered, among other items, more than twenty
ounces of cocaine and several firearms, including a Colt AR 15 .223
caliber rifle with a high capacity magazine.16 Avery admitted that he
owned the weapons and acknowledged that he sold cocaine from the
residence.1
63
On March 7, 2000, an eight-count indictment was issued against the
defendant.164 The defendant was later convicted on all counts, 16and sub-
sequently appealed the convictions and sentences on count six and count
one, which alleged the possession of firearms and cocaine, respec-
tively. 166 With respect to count six, the defendant argued that the indict-
ment failed to allege the rifle he was charged with possessing during a
trafficking crime was a "semi-automatic assault weapon."' 167 Under the
applicable statute, "semi-automatic assault weapons" are defined as
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 970.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 295 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2002).
160. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1165.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1165-66.
163. Id. at 1166.
164. Id. at 1163.
165. Id. at 1164.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1169.
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weapons "known as ... Colt AR 15." 168 The defendant was sentenced to
a statutory minimum of five years, but the district court increased this
sentence to ten years because the firearm that the jury found the defen-
dant possessed was a "semi-automatic assault weapon."' 69 Yet neither the
indictment nor the jury instructions discussed whether the firearm was a
"semiautomatic assault weapon."'170 The defendant argued that even if
weapon type was a sentencing factor, the weapon type still had to be
"alleged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" in order for the court to invoke the mandatory minimum
sentence. 171
Additionally, the defendant appealed count one of the indictment,
which charged him with possessing thirteen grams of cocaine. 72 Accord-
ing to the statute the defendant was charged under, this amount of co-
caine would raise the statutory maximum penalty from twenty to forty.
years. 173 The defendant argued, therefore, that the district court's failure




As to count six, the Tenth Circuit began its response to the defen-
dant's argument by referring to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Harris, and its own ruling in Lujan.175 The court noted that under those
cases, Apprendi's rationale does not apply "where a fact increases a de-
fendant's mandatory minimum sentence but does not increase the maxi-
mum statutory penalty facing a defendant.' 76 The court did not stop
there, however. Even if the defendant's argument was not foreclosed by
the court's interpretation of Harris, the argument would still fail due to
the wording of the statute under which he was charged. 177 When the jury
convicted the defendant on count six of the indictment, it found the de-
fendant guilty of possessing a "Colt AR 15 .223 Caliber rifle" beyond a
reasonable doubt.178 The court called this fact dispositive because in the
statute the defendant was convicted of violating, "semi-automatic assault
weapons" are defined as weapons "known as ... Colt AR 15. ' The
fact that was necessary to apply the mandatory minimum sentence had
168. Id. at 1171-72.
169. Id. at 1169.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1171.
172. Id. at 1181-82.
173. Id. at 1182.
174. Id. at 1181.




179. Id. at 1171-72.
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been charged and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 180 There-
fore, the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence was properly invoked
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction on count six.,
81
As to the defendant's appeal of his sentence on count one, the court
began by recognizing that the thirteen grams of cocaine charged in the
indictment was enough to raise the statutory maximum penalty from
twenty to forty years.' 82 The jury, however, was never instructed on the
quantity issue.'8 3 Therefore, there would be an Apprendi violation if the
defendant was sentenced to more than the statutory maximum.' 84 The
court recognized that on this point its own decisions had been inconsis-
tent. 185 In some cases, the Tenth Circuit found that failure to submit drug
quantity to the jury was not erroneous under Apprendi.186 In other cases,• . 187
the Tenth Circuit did find error in such a circumstance. However, in
this case, because the sentence imposed, seventy-eight months, fell be-
low the original twenty-year maximum, the court declined to find an
Apprendi violation, despite the increased maximum possible penalty. 18
The Tenth Circuit based its conclusion on the principle that no "substan-
tial right" was violated if the sentence imposed was below the maximum,
even assuming there was error in failing to submit drug quantity to the
jury. 189 The court affirmed the defendant's conviction on count one, aswell as the convictions on all other counts.190
B. Sixth Circuit
1. United States v. Strayhorn'
91
The rule from McMillan, that sentencing factors need only be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence where such findings increase
the statutory minimum penalty that can be imposed on a defendant, was
questioned after the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, almost fifteen
years after the Court's decision in McMillan.192 The Sixth Circuit ap-
peared to be alone in not following McMillan with respect to mandatory
180. Id. at 1172.
181. Id.




186. Id. (citing United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1182 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001)).
187. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1182 (citing United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir.
2001)); United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 575 (10th Cir. 2000).
188. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1182.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 250 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (extending Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences; the
Sixth Circuit recognized that Harris overruled this extension in Mazzio and Leachman).
192. Harris, 536 U.S. at 548.
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minimum sentences, 193 and ignored the Court's holding in deciding thecase of United States v. Strayhorn. 194
a. Facts
In Strayhorn, an informant notified the Drug Enforcement Admini-
stration ("DEA") that the defendant regularly supplied him with mari-
juana. 195 Upon executing a search warrant at the defendant's residence,
agents recovered 48 pounds of marijuana, three thousand dollars in cash,
and a handgun. 196 The defendant was indicted and count one charged him
with conspiracy to possess and "distribute 'a measurable quantity of
marijuana."' 1 97 The defendant pled guilty to this count, but reserved the
right to challenge the quantity of marijuana attributed to him and relevant
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). 98 The
United States Probation Office's pre-sentence report attributed a total of
414 pounds of marijuana to the defendant, yet gave no indication of how
it reached this figure. 199 Taking the defendant's prior criminal history and
the fact that he accepted responsibility for the acts charged into account,
the defendant was eligible for a sentence of between 57 and 71 months
under the Guidelines.20 The probation officer insisted, however, that the
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to possess 414 pounds by a defen-
dant with a prior felony drug conviction was ten years.20 1 The defendant
reiterated that he wished to plead guilty only to possession of a total of
22 20348 pounds. °2 The defendant was sentenced to ten years.
b. Decision
On appeal the defendant asserted that the district court violated his
due process rights by finding the drug quantity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 204 The Sixth Circuit noted that pursuant to Apprendi, "the gov-
ernment must name in the indictment the quantity of drugs for which it
seeks to hold the defendant responsible, ' 2°5 and that if the drug quantity
subjects the defendant to an enhanced sentence, it must be considered an
element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor.206 The court then
vacated and remanded the defendant's case on the rationale that the find-
ing of drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence raised the sen-
193. United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 921 (6th Cir. 2001).
194. 250 F.3d at 470.








203. Id. at 466.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 467-68.
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tence from a maximum of ten years to a minimum of ten years. 20 7 In do-
ing so, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
208Amendment rights had been violated.
In deciding Strayhorn, the Sixth Circuit never acknowledged the
Supreme Court's holding in McMillan, which would have required a
different conclusion under these facts. Additionally, the Supreme Court's
decision in Harris clearly refuses to apply the Apprendi analysis to situa-
tions involving increased mandatory minimum sentences. 2°
2. United States v. Mazzio
210
a. Facts
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit court decided United States v. Mazzio,2 '
wherein it concluded that Harris overruled its earlier holding in Stray-
horn.212 In April 1999, the defendant, Anthony Mazzio, was stopped by
members of a drug task force in Wayne County, Michigan, on the suspi-
cion that he was involved in narcotics activity.213 When members of the
task force searched the vehicle the defendant was driving, they discov-
ered ten kilograms of cocaine. 1 4 A ury convicted the defendant, and a
judge sentenced him to 240 months. The judge determined the quantity
of cocaine by only a preponderance of the evidence.216 The defendant
217
moved for a new trial but the district court denied the motion.
b. Decision
The Defendant appealed on several grounds, including Apprendi
218violations. He claimed that Apprendi required that the government
charge the quantity of cocaine the indictment and prove the amount to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, because this fact increased the
minimum penalty that the judge could impose on the Defendant. 2' 9 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court, and noted that the government had
conceded that an Apprendi error occurred in this case.2 However, the
Government made its concession before the Supreme Court decided
Harris.221 The Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier position on whether Ap-
207. Id. at 471.
208. Id.
209. Harris, 536 U.S. at 556.
210. 2002 WL 31164256 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2002).
211. Mazzio, 2002 WL 31164256, at * 1.
212. Id. at *7.
213. Id. at *1.
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *3, *6.
216. Id. at *6.
217. Id. at *3.






prendi applies to facts that affect mandatory minimum sentences, stating:
"[T]he decision in Harris leaves little doubt that ... Strayhorn [is] over-
ruled to the extent [it applies] Apprendi to enhancements of mandatory
minimum sentences. 222 After Harris, the majority of circuit courts re-
fuse to extend Apprendi to cases that increase mandatory minimum sen-
tences based on sentencing factors.223
Ill. ANALYSIS
It is logical for courts to extend the rationale of Apprendi to manda-
tory minimum sentencing.224 The prosecution should be required to sub-
mit any fact that increases a defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise
legislatively mandated range for the offense of conviction to a jury and to
prove such a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule would address
some of the ambiguity of the Harris decision.225 Certainly it would clar-
ify the extent to which legislatures can redefine crimes in order to avoid
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof required by Apprendi.
The loss of liberty a defendant experiences and the stigma that society
attaches to a criminal offense are increased where a sentence is raised
226beyond the prescribed statutory maximum penalty. But as Justice
Thomas noted in his dissent in Harris, the results are the same when a
227defendant is subject to a higher mandatory minimum sentence.
"Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dis-
pute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is other-
wise prescribed. 228
The concern that defendants have notice of the specific penalties
they face in a criminal proceeding likewise compels an extension of Ap-
prendi to mandatory minimum sentences. 229 When a legislature defines a
crime, the penalties it attaches to that crime serve as notice to the public
230
of what punishment a person may face if he or she commits the crime.
Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes do not provide this notice be-
cause they expose defendants to increased penalties for the same crime,
based on factors not listed as part of the crime or even provided in the
indictment when the defendant is charged.23t
222. Id. at *7.
223. Leachman, 309 F.3d at 383; Avery, 295 F.3d at 1171; United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d
806, 809 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2001); United States
v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Aguayo-Gelgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934
(8th Cir. 2000).
224. Levine, supra note 18, at 382-83
225. Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note 130, at 242.
226. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 560 (2002).
227. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 608-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 579-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Finally, even the dissenting justices in Apprendi acknowledged that
the majority's reasoning in that case extended to mandatory minimum
sentences.232 Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor stated, "[T]he
Court appears to hold that any fact that increases or alters the range of
penalties to which a defendant is exposed -- which, by definition, must
include increases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum pen-
alties -- must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 233
CONCLUSION
"To allow a fact to effect the punishment prescribed by law without
treating that fact as an element of the crime thus offends the historic 'in-
variable linkage of punishment with crime.' ' 234 Considering the princi-
ples of fairness and due process inherent in our legal system, extending
this principle to mandatory minimum sentencing is a natural and logical
step. The decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on this issue,
though bound by Supreme Court holdings, indicate that the court is will-
ing to consider this step, yet unwilling to take it. There is no doubt, given
the constitutional significance of Apprendi issues, that courts will be
faced with these situations repeatedly in the future. Given the right fac-
tual circumstances, and in light of the volatility of the decisions in this
area, the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court may reconsider their re-
luctance to take this logical step and require that any fact that increases a
defendant's sentence beyond the legislatively mandated range for the
offense of conviction be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Steven Josephy*
232. Id. at 836.
233. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 533 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
234. Olsen, supra note 2, at 835 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478).
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